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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Randy L. McKinney, ) 
Petitioner) 











Petition For Post 
Conviction Relief 
VS: .'-
State of Idaho, 
Respondent) 
Comes now, Randy L. McKinney, the Petitioner in the case at 
bar, who submits to this Court this Petition for Post Conviction 
relief. 
THE PETITIONER ALLEGES AS FOLLOWS: 




1 B). The judgment and sentence in this case was imposed by 
2 the Seventh Judicial Dtstrict Court, in and f9r Butte County. 
3 C). The case number under which I was convicted is as follows 
4 CR-1981-38. 
5 The offenses fo~ which I was convicted and sentenced 






















c) Conspiracy to commit Murder; 
d) Robpery; 
e) Conspiracy to commit Robbery. 
D). The date upon which the sentences were imposed is, 
The terms of the sentences imposed were as follows: 
a). Premeditated Murder, Death; 
b). Felony Murder, Death; 
C) • Conspiracy to commit Murder, Thirty years; 
d). Robbery, Fixed life; 
e). Conspiracy to commit Robbery, Thirty years, 
(There was also a consecutive term for the use of a firearm durin 
the commission of the above offense. This was a 15 year term). 
E). The Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and then 
proceeded to a Jury Trial. 
F). The Petitioner did appeal from the Judgment and the 
Sentence imposed. The Petitioner has filed several different types 
-2-
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1 of appellate actions, but the only one which is relevant to the 
2 instant case is the case from the Idaho State .. supreme Court which 
3 was listed under case number 38527-2011, and for which the 






















G). The following are the grounds that I believe clearly 
entitle me to Post Conviction Relief. 
I). Whether or not the convictions for felony murder, 
robbery, conspiracy to commit Robbery, ,conspiracy 
to commit. murder are illegal because they violate 
constitutional and statutory prohibitions against 
double jeopardy, and multiple punishments for the 
same actions? 
' 
II). Whether or not upon re-sentencing, and pursuant to 
the binding plea agreement, the Petitioner was 
sentenced for "premeditated Murder", or was the 
Petitioner sentenced for "First Degree Murder" 
(Felony_Murder), and to continue to refer to the 
sentence and conviction as Premeditated Murder is 
not correct and violates Due Process? 
III). Whether or not the sentence imposed,. (Whether or 
not agreed upon by all parties), is i-llegal, as 
there was no provision in the laws, at the time of 
the commission of the offenses, for the Court to 
impose a "Fixed life" sentence. (The Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to impose such a term) 
IV). Whether or not the Petitioner has been denied his 
right to the effective assistance of counsel? 
H). The Petitioner has previously filed the following 
Petitions/Appeals in the listed Courts: 
a). State V. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 687 P.2d 570, 
(1984), Direct Appeal from Conviction; 
b). McKinney V. State, 115 Idaho 1125, 772 P.2d 1219, 





























c). McKinney V. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144, 
(1999); Appeal from denial of Successive Post 
Conviction Petition. 
d). McKinney v. state, 143 Idaho 590, 150 P.3d 283, 
(2006), Appeal from second successive Post 
Conviciion Petition. 
e). McKinney v~ Fisher, 2009 WL 31S1106, *5, (D. Idaho 
(2009), Federal Habeas Corpus Petition, which was 
granted in part, and lead to the Petitioner being 
resentenced. 
f). State V. McKinney, Number 38527, as_ was filed in 
the Idaho_ State Supreme Court. This· was from an 
appeal on the denial of a Criminal Court Rule 35 
Motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Rule 
35 Motion was timely filed after re-sentencing, 
and th~ above cited appeal was denied on January 
3rd, 2013, wherefore this Post Conviction Petition 
is timely filed. 
I). I am alleging that my Counsel failed to adequate 
represent me during several different stages of these proceedings 
which are listed herein: 
aa). Counsel, during the plea negotiations. which lead 
to the binding plea, and the re-sentencing in this 
case, informed me that I would be re-sentenced to 
first degree murder, (Felony Murder), NOT 
premeditated murder; 
bb). Counsel ~urin9 the re-sentencing was ineffective 
for not ·arguing that all of the convictions 
should have been nu,~rged into the "Felony Murder" 
conviction, and therefore I have been given 
mutiple punishments for the same actions; 
cc). 
dd). 
Counsel for the Petitioner failed to recognize 
that at the time of the commission of the offense~ 
Idaho Law provided for the sentence(s) of Death, 
or life in prisonment for the crime of first 
degree murder. (There was no sentence possible 
for a "fixed Life Term", and as such counsel was 
ineffective for allowing me to be sentenced at 
the time I was re-sentenced, to a term that the 
Court lacked statutory authority to impose. 




























J). The Petitioner is seeking leave to proceed In Forma 
Pauperis. That Motion and request is attache~~heretofore, and is 
properly before this Court. 
K). The Petitiorl~r is also seeking leave to have Counsel 
Appointed to represent him during this process. The Petitioner 
has also enclosed heretofore the Motion for such a request. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
For the reasons as given herein, the Petitioner does request 
that this Court order chat the terms of the plea agreement which 
was entered into upon re-sentencing only allows the Petitioner to 
be sentenced for a Conviction of First Degree Murder, (Felony 
Murder), and NOT First'Degree Premeditated Murder, there being no 
mention of the word PREMEDITATED within the plea agreement. 
Furthermore, for the reasons as given in this Petition, it 
is clear that all of th~ underlying crimes should have been 
merged with the crime of Felony Murder, and this Court should 
Order as such. 
Finally, it is clear that at the time of the commission of 
the offense, Idaho Law did not provide for.a "Fixed Life" term, 
and based upon this the Petitioner does request that he be 
re-sentenced to a term of LIFE, and that he be granted credit fo 
time served herein. 
The Petitioner would ask this Court to allow the record of 
















Supreme Court in case number 38527. 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
) 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
SS: 
I, Randy L. McKinney, being duly sworn an placed upon my 
oath, depose and state that I have subscribed to the foregoing 
Petition; That I know the contents thereof; and that the matters 
and allegations therein set forth are true and correct to the 
best of my belief and knowledge. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 



















CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Comes now, Randy L. McKinney, the Petitioner herein, who CertifieE 
that he served a true and correct copy of the aforegoing upon the 
parties entitled to such service by depositing a true and correct 
copy of the enclosed document in the United States Mail, first class 
postage pre-paid and addressed as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Seventh Judicial District Court 
Butte County Courthouse 
Post Office Box 736 
Arco, Idaho 
83123 
-~1~-?-e-t-itio_n_e_r __ _ 
Butte County Prosecutor 
Butte County Cou~thouse 




Randy L. Mckinney, 
I.S.C.I., Unit 10 
Post Office Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 
83707 
Randy L. McKinney, 
VS: 
State of Idaho, 
#18329 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE 
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Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief 
Comes now, Randy L. McKinney, the Petitioner herein, who submits to this Court this 
Memorandum of Law in support of the Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed here in. 
The issue as to whether or not the Petitioner has been subjected to a 
Violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States, and the State of Idaho's Consti-
tution, was submitted to this Court previously, and this Court and the Idaho State Supreme 
Court, held that it could not be brought before the Court for 
000013 
be brought before the Court for review within the context of a Rule 
35 Motion. 
The Idaho state Supreme Court affirmed this holding, and did not rule upon the merits of the 
argument, instead holding that the issue could not be decided in a Rule 35 format, and therein 
affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 35 Motion. 
The Illegality Of Mr. McKinney's Sentences Did Not Become Clear Until The 
November 18, 20q9 Sentencing Hearing For First Degree Murder. 
Mr. McKinney's challenges to the legality of his sentences arise from both double-
jeopardy/merger violations, as well as violations of Section 18-301. While a person can be 
charged with greater and lesser included offenses, and can be found guilty of offenses 
arising from the same act, a person cannot be convicted of a greater and lesser offense, and 
cannot be punished for the same act in different ways under Section 18-301. See State v. 
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 758 (1991); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211-13 (1986). Thus, the 
illegality of sentences or punishments for offenses arising from the same act, or for greater 
and lesser offenses, does not become clear until sentencing is complete. 
It was not until the district court imp'osed a fixed life sentence upon Mr. McKinney for a 
single count of first degree murder that his conviction and sentence for robbery became 
illegal. If the parties and the court had agreed to vacate Mr. McKinney's first degree felony 
murder in the perpetration of a robbery conviction, but otherwise maintain his first degree 
murder conviction on the basis of premeditated, willful and deliberate murder, robbery would 
not be a lesser included offense of premeditated murder, and Mr. McKinney's sentences for 
first degree murder and robbery would not merge. 
2 
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The State had numerous opportunities to avoid this problem, but chose not to. For example, when 
charging Mr. McKinney with first degree murder in the criminal information, the State could have limited 
the basis for the murder charge solely to premeditated, willful, deliberate murder, rather than including 
the alternative of felony murder. Or, when drafting the sentencing agreement, the State could have 
sought a stipulation from Mr. McKinney and his counsel to vacate felony-murder in the perpetration of a 
robbery as a basis for Mr. McKinney's first degree murder conviction, thereby limiting Mr. McKinney's 
first degree murder conviction to a premeditated, deliberate and willful killing. The State simply failed to 
do so, even though it drafted the Rule 11 sentencing agreement and such a stipulation would have 
been permissible. (R.38527, pp.11-10.) 
Similarly, it was not until Mr. McKinney was sentenced for first degree willful, 
premeditated, deliberate murder and felony-murder in the perpetration of a robbery, that his 
punishment for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder became illegal. (38527 Tr., p.3, 
L.25 -pA, LA.) If Mr. McKinney had not been resentenced for first-degree murder, then both 
his merger and Section 18-301 claims relating to first degree murder and conspiracy to 
commit first degree murder, would never have come to fruition; the imposition of multiple 
punishments for a single act which results in more than one conviction, or the possibility 
thereof, is what triggers application of Section 18-301. Thus, Section 18-301 claims simply 
do not arise until sentencing. 
Finally, given the State's knowledge of Mr. McKinney's double-jeopardy and Section 18-
301 concerns about his convictions and sentences, which Mr. 'McKinney made no attempt to 
hide, it should come as no surprise Mr. McKinney maintains these 
3 
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problems persist even after the sentencing on November 18, 2009. (Answering Br., p.20.) 
The illegality of his sentences is not something Mr. McKinney agreed to in the Rule 11 
agreement. (38527 R., pp.11-6; 38527 Tr., passim.) While the State seeks to present the 
agreement as inuring only to Mr. McKinney's benefit by removing the risk of the penalty of 
death, that is simply not the case. Under the agreement, the State was relieved of its burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, thirty years after the crime, Mr. McKinney killed Mr. 
Bishop in the perpetration of a robbery, and that he acted with the specific intent to take Mr. 
Bishop's life. In addition, the agreement relieved the State of its burden of persuading a jury 
that despite decades of good behavior and mountains of mitigating evidence stemming from 
Mr. McKinney's history and background, the death penalty would be just. 2 Thus, both parties 
benefited from the agreement, and the illegality of Mr. McKinney's sentences did not become 
clear until sentencing was complete. 
Mr. McKinney's Robbery Conviction Is A Lesser-Included Offense Of First-Degree Felony 
Murder And The Two Must Merge 
Mr. McKinney was charged with and convicted of first degree murder based on two 
alternative means: the willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of Mr. Bishop, and killing 
Mr. Bishop in the perpetration of a robbery; he was also charged with and convicted of 
robbery for the same offense underlying his felony-murder conviction. (See R.14551, pp.72-
74, 124-26.) 
2 The agreement also relieved the State, and the County, of the financial burden of paying for 
a capital resentencing before a sequestered jury, in a case predating the capital crimes 
defense fund. See I.C. 19-2126 (custody of jury during trial); I.C. § 19863A (capital crimes 
defense fund authorized in 1998). 
4 
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It is without question that one cannot be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. U.S. CONST. amends V, XIV. This prohibition means "a defendant may not be 
convicted of both a greater and lesser included offense." Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211 (quoting 
State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433 (1980». Whether the prohibition against double-
jeopardy prevents Mr. McKinney from being punished for both felony-murder in the 
perpetration of a robbery, and robbery, depends on whether robbery is a lesser included 
offense of felony-murder in his case. If all of the elements needed to support Mr. McKinney's 
conviction for robbery are included in the elements needed to support Mr. McKinney's 
conviction for felony-murder, then the robbery is a lesser included offense of felony murder. 
Id. 
Idaho employs the indictment or pleading theory to determine whether an offense 
constitutes a lesser included offense. fd. According to the pleading theory, if the offense 
alleged in the information is a means or element of the commission of the higher offense, the 
offense is a lesser included offense and must merge with the greater offense. Id. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held where a defendant's acts committing a robbery create liability under 
the felony-murder statute, the robbery conviction is a lesser included offense of the felony 
murder and the two offenses must merge. Id. at 208; Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 756-58. Where a 
defendant has already been convicted and sentenced for the greater and lesser offenses, the 
district court must vacate the sentence for the lesser offense. Id. 
With respect to first degree felony-murder, Mr. McKinney was charged by criminal 
information, Count I, as follows: 
th 
That the defendant, RANDY LYNN MC KINNEY, on or about the 8 day 
of April, 1981, at a place located approximately 5 miles north of Arco, 
5 
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Idaho, and 1 mile east of Highway 93 on a county road in the County of Butte, 
State of Idaho, then and there being did then and there ... at a time when the 
said defendant was in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate robbery, 
kill and murder one Robert M. Bishop, Jr., of Blackfoot, Idaho, a human being, 
by shooting said Robert M. Bishop, Jr., in the head with a revolver type 
handgun and thereby mortally wounding the said Robert M. Bishop, Jr., from 
th 
which he died on the 8 day of April, 1981, in violation of Sections 18-4001 and 
18-4003(a) and (d) of Idaho Code. 
(R.14551, p.72.) Mr. McKinney's jury was similarly instructed: 
In this case, to warrant a verdict of guilty under Count I of the crime of First 
Degree Murder by perpetrating, or attempting to perpetrate, Robbery, you 
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that: 
1. The defendant, Randy Lynn McKinney; 
2. In Butte County, Idaho, on or about April 8, 1981; 
3. In the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate Robbery, intentionally 
or accidentally shot and wounded with a firearm, and by such 
wounding, directly caused the death of Robert M. Bishop, Jr. 
These are the essential elements or material allegations of such 
crime charged in Count I, and the State of Idaho is required to prove each of 
these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(14551 Tr., p.1603, L.22 -p.1604, L.11; R.14551, JI 27.) With respect to the robbery, 
Mr. McKinney was charged by criminal information, Count IV, as follows: 
th 
That the said defendant, RANDY LYNN Me KINNEY, on Of about the 8 day of 
April, 1981, in the County of Butte, State of Idaho, did feloniously and by 
means of force or fear, take from the possession, from the person, or from the 
immediate presence of Robert M. Bishop, Jr., certain personal property, to-wit: 
a wallet containing money and credit cards, and a jacket belonging to Robert 
M. Bishop, Jr., and also a 1979 Ford Mustang automobile, the property of 
Great Western Financial Corporation d/b/a/ New America Real Estate, all of 
which was accomplished against the will of said Robert M. Bishop, Jr., in that 
the said defendant threatened to shoot and shot Robert M. Bishop, Jr., with a 
handgun. I.C. 8-6501. 
(R.14551, p.73.) Mr. McKinney's jury was similarly instructed: 
6 
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In this case, to warrant a verdict of guilty of the crime of Robbery, Count 111, 
you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
1. On or about April 8, 1981, in Butte County, Idaho; 
2. Robert M. Bishop Jr. had possession of certain personal property, to-
wit: a wallet, containing credit cards, or a jacket, or a 1979 Ford Mustang 
automobile; 
3. Randy Lynn McKinney took some of said property from the person, or 
immediate presence, of Robert M. Bishop Jr., and against his will; 
4. Randy Lynn McKinney accomplished the taking by force or fear and 
with the intent permanently to deprive Robert M. Bishop Jr. of the property. 
These are the essential elements or material allegations of the crime charged 
in Count Ill, and the State of Idaho is required to prove each of these elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(14551 Tr., p.1607, Ls.1-18; R.14551, Jl31.) 
Mr. McKinney's jury found him guilty of both first degree felony murder in the 
perpetration of a robbery, and robbery, as charged in Counts I and IV of the criminal 
informatiom (R.14551, pp.72-74, 124, 126.) Mr. McKinney's jury was also instructed 
and found him guilty of the willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of Mr. Bishop. 
(Tr. 14551, p.1602, L.1 -p.1603, L.20; R.14551, p.123; R.14551, Jl26.) 
The criminal information, jury instructions and jury verdicts all reflect 
Mr. McKinney's acts in the commission of the robbery created liability under the robbery 
3 The offenses charged in the information do not align with the jury verdicts numerically 
because the information was premised on Mr. McKinney and Dovey Small, his codefendant, 
being tried together in a single trial. Ms. Small moved to sever her case from Mr. McKinney's 
case for trial, while Mr. McKinney moved for a change of venue. The change of venue motion 
was granted. As a result, Ms. Small's case remained in Butte County, while Mr. McKinney's 
case was transferred to Bonneville County, resulting in a de facto grant of Ms. Small's motion 
to sever her trial from Mr. McKinney's trial. (R.14551, pp.93-96.) As a result, Count II of the 
criminal information which charged Dovey Small with aiding and abetting Mr. McKinney in 
the murder of Mr. Bishop, as well as Count V of the criminal information charging Ms. Small 
with aiding and abetting the robbery of Mr. Bishop, became inapplicable to Mr. McKinney, 
once he and Ms. Small were ordered to be tried in separate counties by separate juries. 
7 
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statute, and was the underlying felony constituting the felony-murder charge in Count I. See 
also State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 182 (1984) (Idaho Supreme Court's lengthy 
recitation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the offenses "due to the allegations of 
error and the imposition of the death sentence."). The State concedes "that, should this Court 
address the merits of this claim without the underlying record, robbery merges with 
McKinney's conviction for felony-murder." (Answering Br., p.22 n.8.) Thus, Mr. McKinney's 
robbery conviction and sentence must be vacated and dismissed on remand." 
On The Face Of The Record, Mr. McKinney Cannot Be Punished For Both 
Conspiracy To Commit Murder And Murder Under Section 18-301 As Everything Mr. 
McKinney Did To Conspire To Kill Mr. Bishop He Did To Kill Mr. Bishop 
At the time of Mr. McKinney's offenses, Idaho law precluded him from being punished 
multiple times for the same acts, and thus prevented the court from sentencing him for both 
murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Section 18-301 provided "an act or omission which 
is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished 
under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or 
omission under any other." (Repealed 1995.) While premised on double-jeopardy principles, 
this provision provided even greater protection than the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions by precluding multiple 
8 
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punishments for the same act, not just the same crime. State v. Horn, 101 Idaho 192, 
197 (1980); State v. Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097, 1099 (1987) (if a defendant is charged 
with two or more crimes arising from the "same act or transaction ... , I.C. § 18-301 
provides broader protection against double jeopardy than the State or Federal 
Constitution, and it bars punishment for more than one of the crimes charged."). 
Whether Section 18-301 applied to a given case depended on whether the Court found a 
defendant's acts to be divisible into separate events, a standard that became known as the 
"temporal test." Sterley, 112 Idaho at 1099-1100. Under the temporal test, if a defendant's 
acts in committing one offense were the same acts necessary for the commission of another 
charged offense, a defendant could only be convicted and sentenced for one of the crimes 
but not both. Id. at 1100-01. In applying the temporal test, the appellate courts would 
specifically look "for separate acts before allowing conviction of two crimes arising out of the 
same incident." Id. at 1101. 
Idaho appellate courts had the opportunity to consider Section 18-301 iri the context of 
multiple punishments for conspiracy to commit a substantive offense, and the substantive 
offense itself, on three occasions before the statute was repealed." Ln State 
s Those cases where a defendant challenged his or her convictions for two or more 
substantive offenses under Section 18-301 are not relevant to Mr. McKinney's argument and 
therefore are not addressed here. See, e.g., State v. Garner, 121 Idaho 196 (1992) 
(defendant could be punished for three counts of aggravated DUI, all arising from the same 
driving act, where there were three victims; Section 18-301 was not intended to prevent 
multiple punishments where more than one victim is involved); State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 
415 (1989) (evidence supporting defendant's convictions for statutory rape and lewd conduct 
with a minor did not establish sequence of events and same facts supported both 
convictions, requiring the sentence for lewd conduct be vacated); State v. Brusseau, 96 
Idaho 558 (1975) (once defendant pied guilty to assault with intent to murder and was 
sentenced to serve a fourteen-year prison term, under Section 18-301, his ten year sentence 
for voluntary manslaughter after his assault victim died, could not stand). 
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V. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564 (Ct. App. 1984), the defendant challenged his convictions and 
sentences for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine), and aiding and abetting 
the delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine), arguing he was punished twice for the same 
act in violation of Section 18-301. In addressing this claim, the Court first considered the 
evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the State. Id. at 
568. The Court then looked to the charging information. Id. at 569. After comparing both, the 
Court concluded: "[u]pon the state's evidence, everything [the defendant] did to aid and abet 
the delivery of the cocaine, he did also in furtherance of the conspiracy. His conduct was one 
continuous 'act'. He did nothing more as a principal by aiding and abetting the delivery of the 
cocaine than he did in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. As a result, the Court concluded the 
jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of conspiracy to deliver cocaine included an implicit 
finding that an agreement existed to do so, which was not an element inherent in aiding and 
abetting the delivery of cocaine. Id. 
Because the additional element of an agreement was found by the jury, the Court of 
Appeals concluded the conviction for conspiracy should be entered against defendant rather 
than aiding and abetting. Id. In doing so, the Court specifically observed: "[o]ur choice of the 
crime for which the conviction should be entered, based upon the jury's verdict, is not 
governed by the severity of the penalty available for the conviction .... Rather, our decision is 
based upon a policy of deterrence arising from enforcement of the crime of conspiracy." Id. 
The following year in State v. Sensenig, 110 Idaho 83, 83-84 (1985), the Court of 
Appeals considered Section 18-301 in the context of the defendant's convictions for 
conspiracy to commit robbery, aiding and abetting robbery, and aiding and abetting 
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burglary. According to the evidence presented at trial, the defendant met two boys in Salt 
Lake City at a Youth Home and offered to give them money in exchange for their help in a 
robbery scheme. Id. at 84. The defendant would provide the boys with "knowhow," weapons 
and transportation, and in exchange, they would commit the offenses; the boys agreed. Id. 
The defendant, his wife and the boys travelled to Pocatello, selected a store, and the boys 
committed a robbery. They then travelled to Idaho Falls where they cased some stores but 
never robbed any of them. They continued onto Twin Falls where they robbed one store. 
Finally, they came to Boise where the defendant enlisted the help of one of the boys to rob a 
Boise store. The defendant drove the boy to the Boise store just before closing time, 
whereupon the boy entered the store and threatened employees with a gun, took money 
from the cash registers, and attempted to flee. Id. at 84. When the boy was caught by police, 
he identified the defendant and his involvement in the robbery. Id. As a result, the defendant 
was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to rob the Boise store, aiding and abetting 
robbery, and aiding and abetting the burglary that happened when the boy entered the Boise 
store with the intent to rob it. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant argued his convictions violated Section 18-301 because the 
conspiracy to commit robbery and the robbery itself stemmed from the same continuous act. 
In addition, he argued his convictions for robbery and the related burglary stemmed from a 
single act and he could not be punished for both. Id. 84-85. 
The Court determined although the acts constituting conspiracy to commit robbery and 
aiding and abetting robbery overlapped, they were not identical. Id. at 85. The Court noted 
the defendant and the boys agreed to rob stores in several locations, 
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and the defendant had engaged in numerous overt acts in Utah, eastern Idaho and 
southern Idaho, to carry out the conspiracy well in advance of the Boise robbery. Thus, 
the Court found because the defendant committed different overt acts to carry out the 
conspiracy to commit robbery, not just those involved in the Boise robbery, his 
convictions stemmed from different acts and were not precluded by Section 18-301. Id. 
With respect to the aiding and abetting burglary and aiding and abetting robbery convictions, 
the Court first observed Section 18-301 permits separate convictions and punishments for 
burglary and any theft or felony offense committed thereafter. Id. (citing State v. McCormick, 
100 Idaho 111 (1979)). The Court explained because the crime of burglary is complete once 
an illegal entry with the intent to commit a theft or felony occurs, the theft or felony that 
follows the illegal entry is a separate act. In the defendant's case, the burglary was 
committed when the boy entered the store with the intent to commit robbery. Id. The robbery 
happened when the boy held up the employees and took the money. Id. 
Although agreeing the defendant's participation in the burglary was identical to his 
participation in the robbery, the Court concluded the defendant's conduct could not be 
considered in a vacuum. The Court observed because Idaho has abolished the distinction 
between accessories and principals who commit the offense, when two people act in concert, 
the acts of one are imputed to the other. Id. (citing I.C. § 181430). Thus, because the boy 
could be convicted of both robbery and burglary, and his actions were imputed to the 
defendant, the defendant could also be convicted and punished separately for aiding and 
abetting robbery and aiding and abetting burglary despite, Section 18-301. Id. at 85-86. 
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Finally, in State v. Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097, 1098 (1987), the defendant was 
charged with and convicted of conspiring with his son to deliver a controlled substance 
(cocaine), and delivery of the same controlled substance (cocaine). On appeal, the 
defendant argued his convictions and sentences for both offenses violated Section 18 
301. The Court first reviewed the criminal information, the facts elicited at trial, and the jury 
instructions. Id. at 1099-1101. The criminal information identified delivery of cocaine as one 
element of the conspiracy to deliver cocaine charge. Id. at 1101. In addition, the trial judge 
had instructed the jury that delivery was one of the components of conspiracy. Id. Under 
these circumstances, the Supreme Court found "everything [the defendant] did to aid and 
abet the delivery of cocaine was also done in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. As a result, 
the Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate the judgment of 
conviction and sentence for either the conspiracy or the delivery offense. Id. 
In light of these cases, it is clear that whether Mr. McKinney's acts in killing Mr. Bishop 
and in conspiring to kill Mr. Bishop are the same acts under Section 18-301, this Court must 
consider: the evidence elicited at trial in the light most favorable to the State; the crimes 
charged in the information; and the instructions relied upon by the jury to find Mr. McKinney 
guilty of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. 
The facts and circumstances surrounding Mr. McKinney's offenses, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the State, were set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Mr. McKinney's 
direct appeal: 
McKinney and his female companion, Dovey Small [who was also separately 
tried and convicted and whose appeal is also pending before 
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this Court] were traveling from California through Idaho, planning to hitchhike 
to Montana or Canada. McKinney carried with him a .22 caliber revolver. While 
the pair were in Malad, Idaho, they were joined by Small's sisters, Ada and 
Kathy, where McKinney showed his gun and indicated he had entered the "big 
time." The group traveled to Blackfoot, where Ada called Bob Bishop (a 
stranger to McKinney and Small), who agreed to transport McKinney and 
Small to the interstate highway where they could continue their hitchhiking 
journey. McKinney stated to Kathy, "I'm going to blow him [Bishop] away." 
When Bishop arrived, Kathy warned him about McKinney and his gun, and 
indicated that he [Bishop] might get hurt. With a group in Bishop's car, 
McKinney, seated in the rear, pointed his index finger at Bishop as if it were a 
gun. 
At a later time, out of Bishop's hearing, Dovey Small stated that Bishop had a 
lot of money and that she and McKinney were going to kill him for some money 
because they had to leave Idaho. At a still later time, Small and McKinney 
discussed killing Bishop and taking his car, money, and credit cards. Dovey 
Small attempted to get one Wheeless to kill Bishop, and, when he refused, 
McKinney asked Wheeless to recommend a good place for the killing, which 
Wheeless also refused. McKinney then stated that he would "just take him out 
on the desert and shoot him and throw some bushes over him and just burn 
him so they can't trace him " Dovey Small agreed and urged that they get it 
over with quickly. 
Bishop drove Dovey Small, Ada, and McKinney to Moore, Idaho, where Dovey 
Small and Ada remained. McKinney and Bishop drove to an abandoned gravel 
pit, presumably for target practice. While Bishop set up targets, McKinney shot 
him through the arm and chest. Then McKinney walked to Bishop and placed 
four more shots in the back of Bishop's head. McKinney then returned to 
Moore and picked up Ada and Dovey Small. When Ada asked for Bishop, 
NlcKinney replied that he had shot him in the stomach and five times in the 
head. When Ada expressed disbelief, McKinney took them to the site and 
showed them the body of Bishop. Ada was then taken to her home in 
Blackfoot. Small and McKinney then drove to Kathy's house, where Dovey 
Small stated that McKinney had shot Bishop. Small and McKinney next drove 
to Pocatello, Idaho and bought some gas with Bishop's credit card. They then 
called Ada to inform her that they were returning to her home, at which point 
the police were called. When the police arrived at Ada's home indicating they 
had a report that there had been a shooting, Ada told the officers that she had 
see·n Bishop's body, that she knew where it was, that McKinney had killed him, 
that there was a weapon, and that the weapon was in the car driven by 
McKinney. 
State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 182 (1984). 
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The basis for Mr. McKinney's first degree premeditated murder conviction is set 
forth in the criminal information: 
th 
That the defendant, RANDY LYNN MC KINNEY, on or about the 8 day of 
April, 1981J at a place located approximately 5 miles north of Arco, Idaho, and 
1 mile east of Highway 93 on a county road in the County of Butte, State of 
Idaho, then and there being did then and there wilfuly, unlawfully, deliberately 
and with premeditation and with malice aforethought ... kill and murder one 
Robert M. Bishop, Jr., of Blackfoot, Idaho, a human being, by shooting said 
Robert M. Bishop, Jr., in the head with a revolver type handgun and 
thereby mortally wounding the said Robert M. Bishop, Jr., from which he 
th 
died on the 8 day of April, 1981, in violation of Sections 18-4001 and 18-
4003(a) and (d) of Idaho Code. 
(R.14551, p.72 (emphasis added).) 
With respect to conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, Mr. McKinney was 
charged by criminal information as follows: 
That the defendants, RANDY LYNN MC KINNEY and DOVEY SMALL, 
th 
on or about the 8 day of April, 1981, in the County of Butte, State of 
Idaho, did combine and conspire to commit the following crime against the 
people of the State of Idaho: THE CRIME OF MURDER IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE. That it was part of said conspiracy that the said defendants 
and co-conspirators would commit the crime of Murder in the First 
Degree in violation of Idaho Code Sections 18-4001 and 18-4003(a) 
and (d). 
In furtherance Of the conspiracy, and to affect the purpose thereof, the 
defendants and co-conspirators performed the following overt acts: That 
the said defendants RANDY LYNN MCKINNEY and DOVEY SMALL 
obtained a handgun. They then invited and encouraged one Robert M. 
Bishop, Jr., to take them in his automobile from Blackfoot, Idaho, to Arco, 
Idaho, and areas around Arco. They then did invite and encourage Robert 
M. Bishop, Jr., to take said RANDY MCKINNEY to an isolated place outside of 
Area, Idaho, at which time the said RANDY LYNN MCKINNEY took a 
handgun into his possession, either loaded or determined that it was in 
fact loaded, that he did aim the gun and shoot the said Robert M. Bishop, 
Jr., in the chest, that he did then walk toward Robert Bishop and aim the 
gun, from very short range, and shoot the said Robert M. Bishop, Jr., four 
times in the head. I.C. §18-1701 
(R.14551, p.73 (emphasis added).) 
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Mr. McKinney's jury was instructed that to find Mr. McKinney guilty of first-degree 
murder by willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, they "must find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt" that: (1) Randy Lynn McKinney; (2) in Butte County, Idaho, on 
or about April 8, 1981; (3) with malice aforethought; (4) willfully, deliberately, and with 
premeditation; (5) unlawfully and intentionally killed Robert Bishop, Jr., a human being, by 
shooting and wounding him with a firearm, and by such wounding, directly causing his death. 
(R.14551, JI 26.) 
In order to find Mr. McKinney guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, Mr. 
McKinney's jury was instructed they had to find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that: (1) Mr. McKinney and Ms. Small intentionally agreed to commit the crime of first 
degree murder of Mr. Bishop in Idaho; (2) Mr. McKinney and Ms. Small had the specific 
intent to commit the crime of first degree murder of Mr. Bishop; (3) During the existence of 
the agreement either Mr. McKinney or Ms. Small committed one of the following overt acts in 
Idaho to effect the first degree murder of Mr. Bishop: (a) Mr. McKinney or Ms. Small invited 
and encouraged Mr. Bishop to take them in his car from Blackfoot to Arco, Idaho and 
surrounding areas; (b) Mr. McKinney or Ms. Small invited and encouraged Mr. Bishop to take 
Mr. McKinney to an isolated place outside of Arco, Idaho; (c) At that time, Mr. McKinney took 
a loaded handgun into his possession; 
(d) Mr. McKinney aimed the gun and shot Mr. Bishop in the chest; (e) Mr. McKinney or Ms. 
Small aimed the gun and shot Mr. Bishop in the head; and (4) The agreement existed and 
any overt acts committed took place on or about April 8, 1981. (R.14551, JI 30.) 
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A criminal conspiracy was defined for the jury as "a crime where two or more 
persons combine or conspire to commit any crime prescribed by the laws of Idaho, and 
one or more of .such persons does any act to further the object of the combination or 
conspiracy." (R.14551, JI 24.) Jurors were further instructed all persons who directly 
commit the act constituting a crime, or who aid and abet one who directly and actively 
commits a crime, or who advise and encourage the commission of a crime, are 
principals under the law and are equally guilty of the crime committed. (R.14551, JI 25.) 
Applying the temporal test to the facts of Mr. McKinney's case, in light of the criminal 
information and jury instructions, it is clear everything he did to kill Mr. Bishop was done in 
furtherance of the conspiracy to kill Mr. Bishop. The information charging Mr. McKinney with 
conspiracy to commit first degree murder lists five overt acts, the fourth and fifth of which are 
acts constituting the crime of first degree murder. Moreover, like the jury in Sterley, Mr. 
McKinney's jury was instructed the first degree murder of Mr. Bishop was an element of 
conspiracy to commit the first degree murder of Mr. Bishop. (14551 Tr., p.1605, L.18 -p. 1606, 
l.24.) In addition, unlike the defendant in Sensenig, none of the overt acts constituting the 
conspiracy to kill Mr. Bishop were committed in relationship to any crime other than the first 
degree murder of Mr. Bishop. 
Consistent with the Court of Appeal's rationale in Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 568, because Mr. 
McKinney's jury found the additional element of an agreement, Mr. McKinney's conviction for 
conspiracy to commit first degree murder should be entered against him rather than the 
conviction for first degree murder. The "choice of the crime for which the conviction should 
be entered, based upon the jury's verdict, is not governed by the severity of the penalty 
available for the conviction .... Rather, our 
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decision is based upon a policy of deterrence arising from enforcement of the crime of conspiracy". 
Id. For these reasons, Hr. HcKinney's first degree murder conviction is subsumed by his conviction 
for conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and he cannot be convicted and sentenced for both of 
these offenses under §18-301. 
WAS THE PETITIONER SENTENCED TO THE CRIME OF "PREMEDITATE»" 
MURDER, OR UPON RE-SENTENCING WAS THE PETITIONER SENTENCED 
FOR THE CRIME OF FIRST DEGREE MUDER? (Felony Murder). 
As part of the records of this case, the Petitioner has attached a copy of the verbatim report 
of proceedings to this Memorandum of Law. 
Exhibit A, as attached heretofore, is a copy of the transcripts of the "Re-Sentencing 
hearing" as took place in this case. Clearly, on page 8, the Court states as follows: " .... we are 
re-sentencing you on the First Degree murder charge to a term of fixed life .... " 
There is no mention of any form of Premeditated murder charge. Simply the First Degree 
Hurder charge. (Felony Murder). Based upon this clear language, the Petitioner was not re-
sentenced on the premeditated murder charge. He WAS re-sentenced on the felony murder 
charge, and there is simply no ambiguity in the language of the Court. 
If in fact there is any type of ambiguity in the sentencing order, it must be resolved in the favor 
of the criminal defendant. To do less would be to deny to the Petitioner Due Process of Law. 
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AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE INSTANT OFFENSE 
WAS THERE A PROVISION IN THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF,IDAHO 
WHICH ALLOWED A COURT TO IMPOSE A SENTENCE OF FIXED 
LIFE? 
The Petitioner entered into a plea negotiation where upon he was re-sentenced to a term of 
"Fixed Life". 
It is the contention of the Petitioner that at the time of the commission of the offenses 
charged, (1981 ), the State of Idaho did not have statutory authority to impose a "Fixed Life" 
term. 
Under the statutory scheme for the offenses for which the Petitioner stands 
convicted, the punishment for the offense of First degree Murder was death, or life 
imprisonment. 
If a person was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment he would become eligible for 
parole release after serving Ten, (10) years of the said same term. 
Wherefore, the Petitioner contends that the Court, upon re-sentencing lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to impose the term that it did. 
A Court's authority to impose a criminal sentence is contained within the statutory scheme for 
the particular offense for which the cr±minal defendant is being sentenced. 
A sentence is illegal and is entered without subject matter jurisdiction if it is in excess of 
applicable law. State V. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 69 P.3d 153,(2003); State V. Peterson, 148 
Idaho 610, 226 P .3d 552, (2010). 
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If in fact the Court imposed a "Fixed Life" sentence upon the Petitioner, for a crime that 
occurred in the year of 1981, and, if the laws in effect in the state of Idaho in the year of 1981 
did not provide for such a sentence, then the Petitioner has been re-sentenced illegally, and 
the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose such a sentence. 
WAS THE PETITIONER DENIED HIS RIGHT TO THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING THE 
RE-SENTENCING AND PLEA PROCEEDINGS? 
The Petitioner has a right to the effective assistance of counsel for his defense. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 a.ce, 2052, (1984). 
This right has been expanded to encompass the right to have the effective assistance of 
counsel during plea negotiations. Lafler 
v. Cooper, 132 a.ce. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398, (2012). 
The Petitioner has set out very specific terms in which he has alleged that Counsel was not 
effective for his defense. See Petition. 
However, above and beyond those issues as listed in the Petition itself, the Petitioner would also 
like to add the issue that even though he agreed in the plea agreement to waive any type of 
appeal, that due to the serious allegations of the re-sentencing, that counsel 
was ineffective for not consulting with the Petitioner about filing an appeal. 
This type of action has already been deemed to be ineffective representation. Please see, 
Campusano V. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 
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(2006). See also. Roe V. 
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 145 L.Ed.2d 985, (2000); Hodge V. United States, 554 F.3d 
372, (2009). 
Given the facts of this case, and the clear and compelling evidence of the errors in this case, it is 
perfectly clear that Counsel should have consulted with the Petitioner about filing an appeal of the 
sentence imposed after the re-sentencing hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
It is for the reasons as given that the sentence imposed upon the Petitioner must be amended to a 
term of "Life", and that the Petitioner be granted credit for time served upon this sentence. 
OATH OF PETITIONER 
Comes now. Randv L. McKinney. the Petitioner herein, who avers and states that he is the 
Petitioner, that he has read the enclosed document, and knows the content thereof and believes it 
to be true and correct to the best of his belief. 
Randy L. McKinney, Petitioner 
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3 THE COURT: All right. Let's take up State 
4 of Idaho vs. Randy McKinney. This is the time set for 
5 resentenclng. Present on behalf of the State, Steve 
; 6 Stephens, Butte County Prosecutor's Office. Lamont 
7 Anderson, I presume? 
8 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. 
'9 THE COURT: Idaho Attorney General's Office. 
; 
2 
1 original of the Rr · . sentencing agreement. I would 
2 note, Your Hanoi, t on Page 3 of the agreement, in 
3 Paragraph 6, Line 3, we have added the number 11 for 
4 Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f){1)(C). That was a mistake on 
5 my part. The parties have Initialed that change; and 
6 then the parties have initialed -- or signed the 
7 agreement on the signature page, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: All right. As I reviewed 
9 this -- at least a copy of this earlier, this was a 
;!O Present on behalf of defendant? 10 binding sentencing agreement; Is that correct? 
11 MS. HAMPTON: Teresa Hampton, Your Honor. 11 MR. ANDERSON: That Is correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Hampton, :12 THE COURT: Teresa Hampton from the Federal 12 
J3 Public Defender's Office; Is that correct? 
14 MS. HAMPTON: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. This Is the time set 
' 
·16 for resentencing. It's my understanding there Is a new 
17 sentencing agreement on this case. Is that correct, 
;!8 Mr. Anderson? 
19 MR. ANDERSON: That Is correct, Your Honor. 
~O If I might approach the bench, Your Honor? 
. !1 THE COURT: Yes. 
22 MR. ANDERSON: {Tendering document to the 
~3 Court). 
1!4 ,. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Z5 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, that Is the 
3 
1 understanding? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
3 THE COURT: I have been provided with the 
4 Rule 11 sentencing agreement. It does Indicate that you 
5 have signed off on that agreement. Have you had a 
6 chance to look at this sentencing agreement? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I have. 
8 THE COURT: And Is that, in fact, your 
9 signature on Page 6? 
0 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, It is. 
1 THE COURT: Okay. Under this sentencing 
2 agreement there's a number of conditions that are going 
3 to apply, and that's kind of what I want to discuss with 
J you just to make sure you fully understand that. Is 
there anything going on with your physical health or 
mental health at this time that would have an effect on 
' your ability to understand these proceedings? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Is there -- do you feel like you 
need additional time to talk with your attorney or any 
other reason why we shouldn't go forward at this time 
with a resentencing? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. I'm ready to go 
forward. 
THE COURT: All right. Under this 
13 anything you want to add before I get started? 
14 MS. HAMPTON: No, Your Honor. We're 
15 prepared to proceed. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Mr. McKinney, I'm 
17 going to have a series of questions for you, discuss 
18 this sentencing agreement. Before we do that, I'm going 
19 to put you under oath. So if you'd stand and raise your 
20 right hand . 
21 (Defendant sworn) 
22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
23 All right. Pursuant to a ruling from the Federal 
24 District Court, then, we're here for a resentencing on 
25 the first-degree murder charge. Is that your 
4 
1 agreement, then, the only thing that we are taking up is 
2 the sentencing on the first-degree murder charge. Do 
3 you understand that? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
5 THE COURT: This doesn't change sentencing 
6 on any of the other original charges in the original 
7 sentence. Is that your understanding? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: I understand, sir. 
9 THE COURT: Under this agreement, then, the 
10 sentence for the murder charge would be a fixed fife 
11 sentence. Is that your understanding? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. You need to understand 
14 that you do have the right fo a new sentencing hearing, 
15 where you can call witnesses and confront the State's 
16 witnesses. The State would also then have the right to 
17 again seek the death penalty under a new sentencing 
18 hearing. Under this agreement, then, you waive the 
19 right to that hearing. The State also waives the 
20 opportunity to present evidence and also seek the death 
21 penalty. Do you understand that? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
23 THE COURT: All right. So again, the 
24 sentencing pursuant to this agreement would be a fixed 
25 life sentence without the possibility of parole. That 
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vvuuta oe concurrent to the other sent ~s on the other 
2 charges. Is that your understandin! 
. 3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
4 THE COURT: Part of this agreement addresses 
5 your rights on appeal. For example, under this 
6 agreement you would waive any right to appeal the 
, 7 decision of the Federal District Court. As you know, 
8 the Federal District Court granted in part your petition 





THE DEFENDANT: Right. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: So you're waiving the right to 
13 appeal that decision to the extent it denied you relief 
14 on your other claims. Do you understand that? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
16 THE COURT: Are you okay with waiving your 
F right to appeal that decision? 
il8 
19 
THE DEFENDANT: At this point, yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Well, it's going to be 
~O permanent. I mean, once you go forward with that, 
t!1 that's where we're at ls, you waive that right to 
22 appeal. 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that. 
1 this binding agr, 
6 
·nt, then, you're waiving your right 
2 to a presentenei ort. Do you understand that? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir . 
4 THE COURT: Typically I would use that 
5 presentence report to assist me in sentencing. It would 
6 contain Information about your general background and 
7 prior criminal behavior. So in this case we're not 
8 having that presentence report. Do you understand that 
9 portion of the agreement? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: We talked about appealing the 
12 decision from the Federal District Court. That also 
13 applies to an appeal on this case. So once sentencing 
14 Is entered on this particular charge, you're waiving the 
15 right to appeal this sentence pursuant to this plea 
16 agreement. Do you understand that? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
18 THE COURT: Is that something that you're 
19 willing to do? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I'm comfortable with 
21 that. 
22 THE COURT: We talked a moment ago about a 
23 possible new capital sentencing hearing where the State 
THE COURT: Often on a sentencing we do have 24 would bear the burden of proving and showing aggravating 
25 presentence reports prior to sentencing. Pursuant to 
1 show mitigating circumstances to address that 
2 sentencing. Again, that's not something that we're 
3 going forward with pursuant to this plea -- this 
4 sentencing agreement; Is that correct? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
6 THE COURT: So you're waiving the right to 
7 present any evidence about mitigating circumstances. 
8 The State is foregoing a capital sentencing, foregoing 
9 the opportunity to seek a death penalty, and not 
7 
0 pursuing evidence as far as aggravating circumstances. 
1 So that's part of the effect of this sentencing 
2 agreement. Do you have any questions about that? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
i THE COURT: Do you feel like you've had a 
full and fair opportunity to ·review this agreement and 
discuss that with your counsel? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you think there's anything 
else that's part of this agreement that we haven't 
discussed? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you feel like you've 
participated in this sentence agreement freely and 
voluntarily? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
25 circumstances. You would have the right to present and 
1 
8 
THE COURT: Is there anything else that you 
2 would like to say regarding this matter before I 
3 pronounce sentence? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Hampton, do you 
6 have anything else? 
7 MS. HAMPTON: No, Your Honor. Thank you 
8 very much. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, do you have 
10 anything? 
11 MR. ANDERSON: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Stephens, do you have 
13 anything else? 
14 MR. STEPHENS: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Mr. McKinney, then, 
16 pursuant to this plea agreement -- or this sentencing 
. 17 agreement and based on the record before me, we are 
18 resentenclng you on the first-degree murder charge to a 
19 fixed life sentence without the possibility of parole. 
20 That will be consistent -- or concurrent with the other 
21 charges on -- the other original charges. So we will do 
22 an amended judgment of conviction wherein the sentence 
23 on the first-degree murder charge will be fixed life 
24 without the possibility of parole. All other sentences 
25 will remain the same as previously set out in the 
4/2012 09:52:38 AM Page5to8of9 000039 2 of 3 sheets 




THE DEFENDANT: No, sir .. I understand. 
MS. HAMPTON: Your Honor, I assume that the 
5 Court will also give credit for time served on those 
i 6 sentences? 
7 THE COURT: Correct. 
MS. HAMPTON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Credit will be given for time 
'10 served on all of those sentences. All right. 
11 Anything else, then, Ms. Hampton? :,2 
' /3 
MS. HAMPTON: No. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else on this, 
14 Mr. Anderson? 
'1 
'15 MR. ANDERSON: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 








MR. STEPHENS: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
(Proceedings concluded) 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BUTTE 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
CASE NO. CR-1981-38 
10 
I, JACK L. FULLER, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, do 
hereby certify: 
That prior to being examined, all witnesses named 
in the foregoing proceedings were duly sworn to testify 
to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth; 
That said proceedings were reported by me in 
machine shorthand at the time and place therein named 
and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me and that the 
foregoing transcript contains a verbatim record of said 
proceedings. 
I further certify that I am not related to any of 
the parties nor do I have any interest, financial or 
otherwise, in the cause of action of which said 
proceedings were a part. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed my seal of office this 4th day of January, 
--£1L Yil6 ______________ _ 
2012. 
Jacr:. Fuller, Idaho CSR #762 
CSR Expiration Date: 07-10-12 
Notary Expiration Date: 04-04~13 
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Steve L. Stephens 
Butte County Prosecuting Attorney 
260 West Grand A venue 
PO Box 736 
Arco, ID 83213 
Telephone: (208) 527-3458 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE 
RANDY L. MCKINNEY 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












CASE NO. CV 13-38 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through the Butte County Prosecuting 
Attorney, and does hereby answer Petitioner's ("Randy L. McKinney") petition for post-
conviction relief in the above-entitled action as follows: 
I. 
GENERAL RESPONSES TO RANDY L. MCKINNEY'S POST-CONVICTION 
ALLEGATIONS 
All allegations made by Randy L. McKinney are denied by the state unless specifically 
admitted herein. 
II. 
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO RANDY L. MCKINNEY'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
1. Answering paragraphs A through C, E and F of Randy L. McKinney's Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent admits the allegations contained therein. Answering 
Paragraph D, Respondent cannot admit nor deny the date sentences were imposed and therefore 
denies the same, but admits the Petitioner was sentenced on the offenses indicated. 
2. Answering paragraph G, the state denies the conclusory allegations. 
ANSWER-I 
C00042 
3. Answering paragraph H, asserting previously filed petitions/appeals, the state 
admits that the petitioner has filed numerous petitions and appeals for post conviction relief. 
4. Answering paragraph I assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel, the state 
denies the allegations. 
5. Paragraph J regarding in forma pauperis request/request for appointment of 
counsel, are not factual allegations capable of being admitted or denied. 
6. Paragraph K regarding leave to have counsel appointed to represent him, are not 
factual allegations capable of being admitted or denied. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Randy L. McKinney's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted. 
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent Randy L. McKinney's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, the 
claims are procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code§ 19-490l(b). 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Randy L. McKinney has failed to file his petition within the one year statute of limitation 
and the claims are now time-barred. Idaho Code§ 19-4902(a). 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Randy L. McKinney's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory 
allegations unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore 
fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906. 
ANSWER-2 
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WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
a) That Randy L. McKinney's claims for post-conviction relief be denied; 
b) That Randy L. McKinney's claims for post-conviction relief be summarily 
dismissed; 
c) for such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case. 
DATED this 1st day ofMay, 2013. 
St~ns~~ 
Prosecuting Attorney for Butte County 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \ 31" day of May, 2013, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ANSWER to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Randy L. McKinney 
I.S.C.I, UNIT 10 
PO BOX 14 




Inmate name- \..,}\JZ:NNE.f 
IDOCNo. _,._....IC..lea+----
Address -:S::sc:;J: 'UtJ ,,:!'IQ 
"P.O,:&,c \Y ~ • .J:.t:> n1P7 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE $~/ENJl:{ 
...• t 
"Jl,_; ·. 
''.:\\ \:HF\\ ;~J h 1 i; I'.? 
\ 
- _tya0 ..... 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF :-&,t-nt:. 
'°R'tit>j Lyh) \J\c.~N~cy' ) 
Case No. DJ .. '2-o \? · ~q, ) 
Petitioner, ) 
) ORDER GRANTING 
vs. ) MOTION FOR 
~'TE. 
) APPOINTMENT 
Or -:l:~Pr.rto ) OF COUNSEL 
) 
Respondent ) 
IT IS HEARBY ORDERED that the Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel is granted and · · %Nd Jc Def~v- (attorney's name), a duly 
licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to represent said defendant in 
all proceedings involving the post conviction petition. · 
DATED this 21 day of ~ , 20..!1_. 
Di~~r}-R 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
Revised I0/13/0S 
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I HUL U...JI U'-t 
, ·'.1u, .. 
- ,-'· I ;-,.. ... tff). 
!)lStt);-. .!if ~ 
20/1, AUG / 9 , r!i;', 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIST:RlCT OF Ph /~·: Si
1 THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNfirOli\.BUTTE 
RANDY MCKINNEY, . ) ~--.. 






STA TE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
TiilS COURT, havjog reviewed the StipUlation to Continue, and having good 
cause therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Motion for Summary Dismissal be set 
for the tr'~ of §ef ·\--, 2014, at Ll_: ~~.m. 
District Judge 
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE 
. 3. 
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I HUL t.ll.f I t..l'-t 
Aug, rn, t ~ H J; 1 ~ PM •'" ' . a r u l H Orr ice No. /04j r. 4/4 . 
CERTIFICATE OF ENTRY 
. ·(\-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .11 day of August, 2014, I served a true and 
conect copy of the enclosed document by mailing, with the correct postage thereonr or by 
causing the same to he hand delivered to the following parties: 
KELLY D. MALLARD 
Mallard Law Office 
P.O. Box 50396 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
STIPULATION AND ORDB.R. TO CONTINUE 
·4-
SIEVE STEPHENS 
Butte County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 736 
Arco,ID 83213 
~.J./1:fl/~ 
Clerk of the Court 
~ Deputy Clerk 
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-- -, If ..... ' ..... /VO. / If q ~. j 
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. ru.rrr {;(1/;· ii ~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tm: SEVENnI .nJDICIAL DISTRICT~ 9.F . ' ; 1: r 
















Case No. CV-13-38 FILE&ay~--
ORDER 
THIS COURT, having reviewed the Stipulation to Continue, and having good 
cause therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Motion for Summary Dismissal be set 
for the /:Z~ay of (hfP'lr, 2014, atlf2_:_£_a.m. . 
=--




v" P. 1 v, L v 1 .,. , • , , nm, ,v111 11 t1 1 u ~ t1 w v 1 1 1 c e No. / I / 4 ~. 4 
CERTIFICATE OF ENTRY 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .2 '::i day of Septembei:, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the enclosed document by mailing
1 
with 'the correct postage thereon, 
or by causing the same to be hand delivered to the following parties: 
KELLY D. MALLARD 
Ma.U~d Law Office 
P.O. Box 50396 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE 
·4-
S'IEVE STEPHENS 
Butte County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 736 
Aroo, ID 83213 
Clerk of the Court 
G00049 
BUTIECLERK 
TlilS COURT, having reviewed tbe Stipulation to Continue, an.d ltavi.ng good 
cause therefore~ 
PAGE 03/eJ4 
lT IS HEREBY OROBRED that Motion for Summary Dismissal be set 
for thetfilbday of Nov. 2014, at 1.Q.:.ao, .,a.m. 
District Judge Antephens 
. 3. 
D ORIGINAL STIPULATION AND 01U)B~ TO CONTINUB 
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··• 
BUTTE CLERK PAGE 04/04 
Oct. 3. 2014 11:05AM .J Law oH:ct No. 72 /6 P. 4/4 
CERTIFICATE OF ENTRY 
u1--:.- Q;J-0\,,e_v-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ..fi.: day of-8eptembel, 2014, r seIVed a true 
and correct copy of'the enclosed dooummtby majling, With the comet postage thereon, 
or by causing the same to be hand delivered to th~ following parties: 
KELLY D. MALLARD 
Malll{d Law Office 
P.O. Box 50396 
Idaho Fallst· m 83402 
STEVE STEPHENS 
Butte Cotmty Prosecutor 
P.O.Box736 
Arco1 ID 83213 
,--;-:::jJ_, _j H:j},J ,r-,~7 . /'/ ~ 1.,_: .. ~ 
Clerk of the Court -
STIPULATION AND ORD.BP. TO CONTINUE 
-4~ 
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., ~, ";' '.' ...... -..... ~. ,• 
i)l_!T ·r·l· 
iJ; ~ r ·1 i·.; f :~ ~ . : 
· · · . . ,· , At, . ,., , · 'l/tt , ;;;,, ZQl.4 otc' I I t\: i /IJ. 
, . IN THEDISTRlC'.F,cotJ)l\()f4 T}fJ:fS~\{~'.fHl{)DI~lAL OJSTRlCT Pf !:HE . 
. , .. ':.,pr, ·~ · ·.~""'' .~· . , · ,.~" .. , . .,. y,· , . · f:.ILEo a y ·· . l__.(]Q 
... S'.f J\TEoitiq~ofm~o-'td~~icoiJN;r;x a~~P17R~-----~r,.'Y) 
;C ;;, ,(\,\ ,>:,fs'',1,'i~};Jli'"''~'""'~¥,11,,!,f;t,, . t,;
1
?'{:J, t1!);~;p; i ' .! ;::t,;t/ i , 
RANbt .. L. MC~~tf 
..: Petitioner'' ', ,, 
vs. 
. ,(>,i,',;}; .• ' ';' . ··· ,,;"::'H/:•1'/!,f,:r··:· ·;;[ ' . . .. , , . . . . . .. , .< ., ·,, . 
. This tnatter ha\iih~t~t). · Ul~1for h~atin$ .Qt,i the,Re~po(lge~t' ~. 1',iotfon for' 
·:_ .'. . fr.',_~· ,. V',. . >·f~· , ·,, ., ? ,·~ .. , '. ',. ,. .• ,, ·th':'· . ~¥*~'.. . , .. ·, .,, ··.. , , ,,· ' 
Summaiynismissal'g,n;J,o:v.em~n a ~7.i0Jijt1~~n"~Vi4g/~V{e~ed~,me;Petitioner' s, , 
~ >· '. ' . '.·l::i'. ,, if¥'.'l'f . {.~ ", .. ,, :"' ' ' ... ~t.', ,,.; .. ",. ,,, ?:i·. . ' :" • ' . ' ','<\ 
ApI>li,cation and:~1~.~i~f~1~f1Jli~ ;e~~~~~~!f~-~w~,t~f¥~~Qn r9r. Judi~ia1 Notice 
a.ccompanyi~g 9C>c~ent~~ttie 'ijt!~lr.tt~f 1p~ik,tht;r{em,iiid~t's•:Motion,for 
Dismissal as no .gen~n~;j~e,citi!~te~,f~(e*!s~; '~iiiiie mattd', ~hould be dismissed 
·,y, . ., ,,• · ' ':);·,,,
1
~·~:,fl't ~ ~"<",""'·-'e •,,,·•'>'.j.'),,,·~~P •' ,.h,'f>)" ,,.:_.,' ,i",•." ·,·, 
as a matter. 0£ law as follows:.:. 
' ~ . :,., ' + ; ''.., t '«[i'. ' ~ ' ' ',": ' 
, tr ers >, 
' ' , >• ,< ':'. ! . ' 'Y , /' ,({( '~'. ... : ,ij\: . , ''.. . 
1. ·Petitioner.w,is.~segt,ens~~~,~bgw ;V J tS;,gpw.rinJilutte·County; Idaho in case 
nuritber CR;-81-5 ,folt~Wifig,J ·.~~t(Qr's~l'itencitig ;~a&tittg!the original' death 
,"(,:<,;f,,i' •\, . ''~'. ,,. • ·,' ',;1it>. f,,,,:\( '... ·,· ,~'.},(,)!;•'' ~ X,'' ,,e ' 
., penalty by the £e~s~ai:'~J~J\0~:~9uttz'fot~the ·~~!$ic~'~f'~&h9 tegm:ding .th~ 
defe~dant,s: sente~tc(f'<5l;v,jQl&~gJ~p):~pde'}f8.7~00j(a)i Tlie · original sentence 
' ':· ' ,;,,· ... ·"' .t~ ,, ' '' ' ' ,', 
was imposed on Ma.tch:3,J,1: 1t.~Rt1 
' ' e!,; ' ' V -~'\ ,,: • *',-rt 
2. The·COU!;fadoptedJl:iejAmf~µtniendatiorls~ofthep,a,ttjes/otsenten~ing pursuant 
,t ·v:.,.. • ., , ,,,, .':. .,. . ·:-1'\. )V '''{" . i' ~ ·;· "'i?f' ,,,', , ·;'o . f;,t ·. W> , ''.;~ • ':;" ' ':', • , 
to ~e' plea''gt,~~~f:~J~~~-'1e·Co~of ~c~~ed'lJfe s~teµce, .. :t'hissentence was, 
run cor1curr~t1t.With~~e;"dpf~ntfintlsie,ci9tlng:~nt~n~\pf:~,.fixed life .serttenc~ :for 
violations qf\4~~·:~pci~J.1'8f~~~:lbni{:ld!lh(pti~~l(§fl10l Js<> from CR.-81-5. · 
3. .·. At the Noveml?ttl°sr2qg,1i~!e~~~g;~::c6.~·;erf~fffied: extensive, Inquiry atid ·. 
: , \, ,. )"-d~· ·jcJ;' ,~ , ','· ~ ·.,, , , 
····colloquy; of the:I?etluo.tteri.lqJli~pl'esfflceoffetUidner:'s two ~ttotneys, regarding the 
',:'nafure·oi~~ch.md,e~~ ·:-.:~ot\~:1~leA;ij~,e~u,nf1nwhich.Petitionerkrttiwingly 




' >A>,, hf, . > 
4. 'fl!e Peti?~,ietfillI:tuii~~~~d ~d'.ifinfuf)i~a"~lifilHd~f1,~f ih~ .. Plea agreement in 
which he wilH11gty,~4:vol\Ui~U: ~t~fetUnt()'Jpirttlf:tecotnmendirig the· Court 
·" •,,, ., }·,1:~. ,.,t ,~,., . . . .,.,,:, ~ ,, -, 4,;~. ,, 1 
enter;a. fixedte~.of'J1f~;~~)~p~~!1.f.i!Ct'!~:~!4te,,il~t,seekirtg'the.a~athipenatty, and 
stated he.was sa.tlsfiea~th. tht,t:eptes~Uiti6b..hii• attfurieys~: 
•.. ' •• ' ' ·:(:': .•·• '· .~. ~{' ,·'"'l, ., ' ! >;t'" .. \'.,, 7 ' • ' ·, 
5. The Court establisli~d'.:ortA:lie~t,d.Jltat)heJ;>,etitioner fully understo.od. the plea 
agr~ment;ancl:liad"11q;~er,neeti, tO dis,CUS,s'the Saille with. lus'two'atforneys. . 
• ..N '.··'
1\,,Ji:_:~ ·:,··rr·~,,, . A. ·•• .• <· ·.· . . . .. ,· ~ . :'." :·· _ , , 
6. . ... At the November ,!~~\~OQ1\sent{9p~g ~~g; i!lf:~etjtio~enw, ~ked by the Court 
. if he understood that '.tticft>Iily tiiiittet:~ef qre;the Co~urt·for re-seQtencing Was the. first-
,, Ji~ /. ···: .. / . .;< ' . ' . ,,. ••·t . . " '. .. •· 
degree murder cha,rge/~<i"rJiatth,e,;,s~tenclfor,tlJ,~.remaining ~J:targess.~()uld retr1ain' 
,.,.., ± ,r,, ··~' ,, ,'i , • 1 ,' , r, 
in plac¢. The Peti.tiirl~rJe~,JlotiH~J:h~t lt~:Wld¢tstoJSdi 
',,: ,.,_,=,.; l",,)< + ; .~'' •• ~,·;. :'~-., ,·. '" "" fl,\, " '.'. ' ' ,_' 
7. Atth~ N'?vetnber. 1'!t?~9,?
11
!~n\~nc!~g:~e~~g, tl1e Pe~itionetwas asked by the Court 
· ifhe.tmderstood)4at:bis,tiittJQ~4ppetil':woiild,be.:w~ved'puts~t to the plea 
''tt' • 
0 
;••,' • '!'f:t, ,; .· .r, '<t/":r, ~r"' · ./ , «;i! , ,"'•, ,, .. 
···agr~etnent. ,Th(f~tiPl!CZ::;~~n,ij~·~Jt'he 1'Pde~~tood."c} ••}tt0·· 
. 8. ·· Petition~r has offet~<fao.!lfdditidnal'JactS"pafitraty;.to,t~e,rec6jd,as to the pedbrtnance 
, . . +./!*~"''". ' ;,})fv.: \ ,\, ,·•\ }"'•,. ,. ' ,' '' ' 
ofliis counsel. . .,, . ,,; 
9. PetiH<>11~r f.ail~4;t~:~I~~~~~~~l!citlt;~~~fictdftl~~2i~~l~¢rfom'18!1~~;byh.is 
co.unselor any prejudt~ ~.~ft!g~tl{~Jivm/ . ' . .·, / ' ' 
~,, ,..?-,', . YJ 'i ·,"- .-f., :; , ; , 
. . ·tobNtCOSIONS;OELAW,' ·,c • 
,,_ ·>''. h ,• ,,'1;:,;- ''$;"_<"',.:/'.",. ·, 1::-~=Jt4""'>" :f,1\. ,.,·' .. ·. :"·\.·i, ··,. ,i·f."'l·>:."j'.' :.: ... ·, ,,, ' '' -,~ 
· 1. J~~·kespondent'~ lriPP~~Jp(SUttttllat,y, J)jStnissa.1:p~cWided sufficient notice to the 
I 1>,.;'·,, "":-<. •. ~·+:i~.,l'.f',., .,.:)~,:.···;: :·,\:,.' '"{> '••;, 
. Pedtiorte(ofthe le$~li1~ues(f or1 \vlµ~l! d.ismissalwas so~t:tt. § 19-4906(b) 
2. The Petidoner's claim tti~'.lli~''s~~ce;'fot,each charge should liave tnetged was 
heard by th~ ,Suprefui. ~~.urtlin,Siare~y;sgi:kihney· J s{ Idaho $~7'(1daho 20J3),. and 
, .. ·,. , ,., ·~_:« ..... · .... :e.:· . . . ·-' . . - .. .. Z'. . , 
found, to have n:o;tnent,!Jl'it;.r ·u~~,.g,t,b); ,;:... . 
3. The Petitioner's cl~~f inef(~Cti~~l~ce ~f: ~<>tmSelis vague and '.corlclusory. 
,•, ,,,·,. ' •! ' -~*·,L ... J.;)H~ . ,. ··,t '.<;:, ,7.i ", 
and fails:to allegt thcrmawier1ffi11ifil~h. ~unsc:d'was,.ip~ffective., ·· :fVolf v. ,State, 152 
·· •. -':' . .. ·~: .. -:=:,:,,. ·~ ;,,., :t,-"' ·.· ~:r~>\ .," :·,.~,,, ,··\··!!'·:,'-".. . • , 
Idaho 64, 67~ 266 P{jdJ(~9{H7~::CCt/{\p~i~Ol 1). t,ci: §t 9 .. 4906(bf 
4 .. ·. 'fheJ>etitioner~;~'~1afui,Y,.af ,h~,;~,~i~~~:for. ~'pretne<lttated murdeJ"" as· opposed to 
. ' .. · ' •· . .• . ··'"·'"' .. ~J .... ' '. ,, . ' ' . .. . .... ' 
"first'.fi ... ¢gree mutd·.·. e.·. rtis.·.,.:~:fd\'btQ~;c ... ·Jtµm··.'"/fot,:which.· 1-etfefcahn,8(he granted, n'or does 
i'·w -:;J: .• " ' 
.the P¢titloner atl~g!'e~·~tifl<filf!~.!lUori,q~i~1~ ~m>it~.!P~'~ollft.ot,,catt~e of 
action for. wliich}relief.~llh 'bit~feiJi. mln'.oJed>~y-.'.th~ ~O\U'G C:itciefi~s,beHef that the 
State W(mld gratuit6usly·~~,~~ :gcIGnney 6fservi11g atty se6tet1ce.;Wha.tsoever (or 
,~;,{;;"'"?{ ·- . . . 
FINDINGS'OF FACT;\CONCtitJSJONS OF LAWVAND ORDER 
;, ,., , ' <:--.'-.,, . ,,;,, ,,,,: t,: ~')~, {;~::~!,;<;f~-;~,i;,?i:;: :/ •, 
i 
000053 
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'nqt ofreyed ~Y. f~fipaau~j~~oni;c~n~;t?::~,l~x#ktdf~e~ ~!~ iss~e could' 
createprejtidice,.l}S/i'lri~a')8,y)Jtl1-t,l(la(On~6,6.~!-lS>6(S8't .. Ig{S.Ct.f205~~.·(tp84);. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BUTTE COUNTY 
RANDY L. MCKINNEY, 
Petitioner , 
V. 










Case No. CV-13-0038 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE PARTY'S 
ATTORNEYS, DAN BEVILACQUA, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR BONNEVILLE 
COUNTY, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, RANDY L. MCKINNEY, appeals against the above-
named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court for the Order Granting the State's Motion to 
Dismiss entered in the above entitled proceedings on or about the 11th day of December, 2014, 
by the Honorable Alan C. Stephens., District Judge. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(c) (1). 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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3. A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal that the appellant then intends to 
assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant 
from asserting other issues on appeal. 
A. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it granted the State's 
Motion to Dismiss? 
4. A reporter's transcript of the following hearing(s) is requested: 
A. Butte County Prosecutor's Motion to Dismiss held on November 18th, 2014. 
5. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
A. Rule 11 Sentencing Agreement dated November 18th, 2014. 
6. I certify: 
A. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter, 
Mary Ann Elliott; 
B. That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee 
because the defendant has previously completed an affidavit and the Court has found him to be 
an indigent prisoner who is represented by appointed counsel, KELLY D. MALLARD, Mallard 
Law Office acting as Butte County Public Defender, that appellant is without funds for payment 
of the reporter's fees and therefore, pursuant to I.C. §31-3220 and §31-3220A and Idaho 
Appellate Rule 24(e) the payment of the reporter's fees should be waived by the district court; 
C. That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for 
preparation of the record because defendant has previously completed an affidavit and the Court 
has found him to be an indigent prisoner who is represented by appointed counsel, KELLY D. 
MALLARD, Mallard Law Office acting as Butte County Public Defender, and that appellant is 
without funds for payment of the preparation of the record and therefore, pursuant to LC. §31-
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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3220 and §31-3220A and Idaho Appellate Rule 27(e) the payment of the preparation of the 
record should be waived by the district court; 
D. That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because the 
defendant has previously completed an affidavit and the Court has found him to be an indigent 
prisoner who is represented by appointed counsel, KELLY D. MALLARD, Mallard Law Office 
acting as Butte County Public Defender, and that appellant is without funds for payment of the 
appellate filing fee and therefore, pursuant to I.C. § 31-3220 and §31-3220A and Idaho Appellate 
Rule 23(c) the payment of the appellate filing fee should be waived by the district court; 
E. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20, and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), 
Idaho Code. 
:\11, 
Dated this jJ_ day of December, 2014. 
aw Office 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
::th 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of December, 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the document described below on the party listed below, by mailing with the 
correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
DOCUMENT: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
STEVE STEPHENS 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
Butte County 
P.O. Box 736 
Arco, ID 83213 
Mary Ann Elliott 
Court Reporter 
P. 0. Box 171 




State House, Room 210 
Boise, ID 83 720-1000 
SARAH B. THOMAS 
Appellate Public Defender 
3050 N Lake Harbor Ste. 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
Randy Mckinney IDOC # 18329 
ISCI Unit 10 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL D1~RICT 4', . 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BUTTE . -------·----~? 
RANDY L. MCKINNEY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 








Case No. CV-13-0038 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
AND WITHDRAWING COUNTY PUBLIC 
DEFENDER FOR APPEAL 
The above named defendant appeared before this Cqurt Post Conviction Relief. The petition 
was dismissed. 
The defendant has requested the aid of counsel in pursing a direct appeal from the Judgment 
of Conviction in this district court. 
The Court being satisfied that said defendant is a needy person entitled to the services of the 
State Appellate Public Defender for purposes of appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 19-852 and 19-854 
and the services of the State Appellate Public Defender are available pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
863A; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with Idaho Code § 19-870, that the State 
Appellate Public Defender is appointed to represent the Defendant on appeal. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appointment of the Butte County Public Defender is 
hereby withdrawn for purposes of appeal. The appointment of the Butte County Public Defender 
shall continue for all purposes other than appeal unless such appointment has been previously 
tenninated by court order. 
:\V' R....b' 1):)6 
DATED this { O day of Decembcr,..lO++ 




CERTIFICA'IE OF SERVICE 
. '(L- ~ Qfl)/5 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this l t>aay of December, 26£4, l served a true and correct 
copy of the attached ORDER APPOINTING STA 'IE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER AND 
WITHDRAWING COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR APPEAL by placing a copy in the United 
States mail, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand delivered to the 
following parties: 
SARAH B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 N. Lake Harbor, STE 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
STEVE STEPHENS 
Butte County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 736 
Arco,ID 83213 
LAWRENCE W ADSEN 
State of Idaho Attorney General 
Appellate Division 
State House, Room 210 
Boise; ID 83 720-1000 
Randy Mckinney IDOC # 18329 
ISCI Unit 10 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
ORDER-2 
KELLY D. MALLARD 
Bonneville County Public Defender 
Bonneville County Courthouse Box 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 . 
Mary Ann Elliott 
Butte County Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 171 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
SUPREME COURT/COURT OF APPEALS 
P0Box83720 




IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
************************************************************************ 
RANDY L. MCKINNEY, 
Petitioner/ Appellate, 
-vs-











SUPREME COURT# 42964-2015 
CERTIFICATION OF 
EXHIBITS 
I, SHELLY SHAFFER, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Butte, do hereby certify, list and describe the 





IN WITNESS WHEREO~ have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
court at Arco, Idaho, this d~ day of May 2015. 





IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
************************************************************************* 
RANDY L. MCKINNEY, 
SUPREME COURT# 42964-2015 
Petitioner/ Appellate, 
-vs-




I, SHELLY SHAFFER, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Butte, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing record in the above-entitled case was compiled and bound under my direction, 
and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings, documents and papers designated to be 
included in the clerk's record by the Idaho Appellate Rule 28, the notice of appeal, any 
notice of cross-appeal, and any designation of additional documents to be included in the 
clerk's record. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
court at Arco, Idaho, this c:61i~day of May 2015. 





IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF IDAHO 
**************************************************************** 










DANIEL BOONE WISEMAN, 
Respondent, 
SUPREME COURT # 42964-2015 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SHELLY SHAFFER, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Butte, do hereby certify I personally served or mailed, by 
United States mail, one copy of the clerk's record and the reporter's transcript in the above-entitled 
case to each of the attorneys of record, to wit: 
Appellant's counsel: Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, Sara B. Thomas, 3050 n. Lake Harbor, 
STE 100, Boise, Idaho, 83703 
Respondent's counsel: Office of the Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden, P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court at 
Arco, Idaho, this a:fiA- day of May 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SHELLY SHAFFER, CLERK 
Clerk of the District Court 
By ~ 
Deputy Clerk 
1 
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